I haven't been blogging lately due to the fact that I have not been in the best of health for the past few days. And yes, you guessed it. I'm writing about Katrina.

Well, perhaps not about it, but about a problem raised by it: the problem of evil. We Christians, of course, have had our fair share of the different theodicies offerred to solve this problem. I have been content with the explanation that God has a morally sufficient reason for letting evil exist (I do not, by the way, subscribe to the popular free will theodicy as I see it to be problematic, though I will not discuss it here).

So I think that would be the best answer to give someone (especially a skeptic) when he asks you about this "problem". Of course I expect an immediate objection: What is the reason for God allowing evil to exist? I will not seek to answer this question here; rather, I pose a simple yet deadly question to the skeptic: What is evil?

Answers has been given to that question: ranging from Kant's categorical imperative to other more subjective reasons. I will not go into a complete refutation of each of these answers here, but suffice to say, one would be hard pressed to prove your definition of evil to be the true one (Considering that there are other definitions out there, all of them conflicting with each other). In this regard, it all boils down to a preference over others.

So, then, if the skeptic states his answer to your questions and goes on to state that that is the reason why he sees such a thing as evil, one can just as easily reply to the contrary and state that it is not! Doug Erlandson has written a more technical explanation in his article "A New Perspective On Evil" (You can find it here) of this:

Let us call the foundation F. F (e.g., the categorical imperative, greatest happiness principle, etc.) cannot itself be part of the system of morality. If it were, it could not serve as the foundation of the system. Rather, F must be a statement (or statements) about the moral system (such statements are sometimes known as metaethical statements ).

At the same time F does not appear to be a statement about a state of affairs (or states of affairs) in the world. If it were, we should expect general agreement on whether it is true or false. At the very least, its proponents should be able to tell us how its truth or falsity could be determined. Metaethical statements, however, are typically open to great dispute. For instance, many people reject the categorical imperative and the greatest happiness principle.

Perhaps F is true by definition. (Kant seemed to treat his categorical imperative in this way.) Competing ethical systems, however, have conflicting metaethical statements. Therefore, if these statements function as definitions, they appear to be arbitrary.

The only remaining alternative is that F consists of statements of preference. Any system of morality which they uphold, then, is entirely subjective. The proponents of such a system cannot rightly question the moral rightness or wrongness of any action. When they do, they are merely expressing their preferences.

If the anti-theist were truly honest he would say nothing more than, "I personally don't like the idea of God allowing evil" or "evil is determined subjectively." He has no right to say anything more. In particular, he has no justification for asserting that a totally good God would not permit preventable evil.

Only with one presupposing the Christian Worldview (and the laws given by God in the Bible) can one seek to use the problem of evil against God. One should not hesitate to point this out to the skeptic that he cannot help but depend on the truth of the Bible!

This entry was posted on Monday, September 05, 2005 at 5:40 PM. |